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ANTI-PELAGIANISM AND
THE RESISTIBILITY OF GRACE
Richard Cross

I argue that accepting the resistibility of grace does not entail accepting either
Pelagianism or semi-Pelagianism, and offer seven models for the offer of grace
that allow for the resistibility of grace: respectively, covenant theology, synergism, and five models that posit no natural human act of acceptance (while
allowing for natural human acts of resistance). Of these, I conclude that all but
covenant theologies avoid serni-Pelagianism, and that all avoid Pelagianism,
as defined at the Second Council of Orange.

'If anyone says that a person's free will when moved and roused by God gives no
co-operation by responding to God's summons and invitation to dispose and prepare itself to obtain the grace of justification; and that it cannot, if it so wishes, dissent but, like something inanimate, can do nothing at all and remains merely passive: let him be anathema.' (Council of Trent, session 6, canon 4)
I

In what follows, I should like to consider a variety of positions on the
Christian doctrines of justification and grace, in an attempt to see whether
the views I discuss can plausibly be said to avoid both Pelagianism and
semi-Pel agi anism. What unites the various positions that I consider is the
belief that justifying grace-justification-is resistible. Any theologian systematically committed to the irresistibility of grace eo ipso avoids
Pelagianism. Pelagianism and the irresistibility of grace are logically
incompatible. (This point will, I hope, become clearer in a moment, once I
have offered a definition of 'Pelagianism.') The reason for considering the
problem is that it is not at all obvious that it is possible to reject
Pelagianism and semi-Pelagianism, while yet holding on to the resistibility
of grace. Calvinist theologians, in particular, are skeptical here. I hope to
show that they should not be. Nevertheless, I shall not be interested in any
historical figures, and my focus here is merely conceptual. I hope, however, that the considerations I offer may be of some help in trying to evaluate
past debates, patristic, medieval, and Reformation. Finally, by way of
introduction, I shall not be concerned with arguments for or against the
resistibility of grace. My interest is solely in determining whether any
view that is committed to the resistibility of grace is ipso facto Pelagian.
First, then, relevant definitions. According to Canon 9 of the Second
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Council of Orange (529), every good act that we do is brought about in us
by God. In line with the Catholic tradition, I understand' good' here to
mean "salutary," and that the view that is being condemned is that we can
in any sense cause our own salvation. Thus, Canon 3 of the same council
condemns the view that the grace of God "can be conferred by human
invocation," a condemnation that (if read as synonymous with Canon 9) is
in accord with the interpretation of 'good' I am presupposing here. 1 And
this gives us the "Pelagian" view that we somehow cause our own justification. Note that if grace is irresistible, then we have no causal role in the
reception of grace, and Pelagianism is thus ipso facto false.
Canon 5 of the Council condemns the view that the beginning of faith in
us is not through the gift of grace. And this constitutes the rejection of the
"semi-Pelagian" view that the beginning of our justification is from us, not
from God. The semi-Pelagian view is distinct from the Pelagian since the
view that the beginning of our justification is from us does not entail that
view that our justification is in any sense caused by ourselves.
Before continuing, we should note that the issues I consider here do not
presuppose or require any particular doctrines of justification or atonement. In terms of justification, my interest is merely in how justification is
acquired, not in what it consists in. (I use 'justification' synonymously
with 'salvation'; this usage is not intended to imply any particular theory
of justification.) In terms of the atonement, we should note that there is no
obvious conceptual tie between justification and any particular theory of the
atonement. In fact, there is no manifest conceptual tie between justification
and atonement at all. There is no obvious conceptual reason why justification cannot proceed quite independently of Christ's saving work.
Traditionally, of course, justification is linked to the atonement in the sense
that the atonement is a necessary condition for justification. Discerning
whether or not such a claim is true is well beyond my aims here, and whatever conclusion were held would make no difference to my argument.'
In what follows, I shall consider seven different views that accept the
resistibility of grace, and assess whether the various views are able to
avoid Pelagianism and semi-Pelagianism. There are clearly more possible
views than these, more or less Pelagian; I have made my choice with an
eye merely on the rejection of Pelagianism and semi-Pelagianism. The
question, of course, is whether or not some view manages to avoid the
claims that we cause our own salvation, or that we initiate our own salvation. Now, it is very hard to work out what is the sufficient cause of some
state of affairs, and almost as hard to work out what counts as the initiation
of a process that results in a certain state of affairs. I do not attempt to provide principled reasons in favor of some analysis over another, partly
because I am not sure that such principled reasons exist in every case. I
rely rather on intuitions. These seem to me firm enough to bear the weight
that I am putting on them-not least because the kinds of intuitions that I
appeal to would, I think, be regarded as sufficient and reasonable for the
sorts of moral judgement that we have to make in daily life (and perhaps
even for legal purposes). But I leave the plausibility of my intuitions here
to the reader to judge.
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II

First, let me begin with what is, from a soteriological point of view, the
weakest theory: the covenant theology of some late-medievals and certain
Arminians. The essence of this view is that God promises to justify-or at
least to offer grace to-someone who satisfies certain minimal ethical conditions. (For the medievals, the relevant condition is for a person Uto do
what is in him" [i.e. to do the best he can]; for the Arminians, the condition
is to lead a minimally good life.)
Is such a view Pelagian? I doubt it. Consider the following general
case. Person x freely promises to do action a if person y acts in way w. We
would not, I think, say that y causes a in the case that y acts in way w. We
would say that x causes a. So, as a case of such a promise or covenant, if
God freely promises to justify me in the case that I satisfy certain moral
requirements, justification is caused not by me but by God.
There is an immediate objection to this line of reasoning. God is necessarily good, and so, as a matter of necessity, keeps his promises. All other
agents are, in principle, peccable. And it may be that the reason why we
assume x causes a in the case that y acts in way w, even if x has promised to
cause a in the case that y acts in way w, is that-given x's peccability-y's
action is not sufficient for a. x could always break his promise. And it may
be that in the case of an agent who cannot break his promise, we would
want to claim that the cause of the ultimate effect is simply the prior
agent-y's causing w is sufficient for x to cause a, and y is thus the ultimate
cause ofa.
I believe, however, that I can buttress my basic intuition here by considering how we assign blame and praise. Consider a case in which some
agent is hard-wired in a way that prevents him from ever breaking a
promise. The agent I have in mind, however, is not conspicuously good in
any other way. Suppose that this agent freely promises to do a bad deed
every time I act in accordance with an obligation of mine. It seems to me
that I am not to blame for the bad deeds that this person causes, even if I
am aware of the promise that he has made. And there is a reason for this.
The agent's promise was free. He did not have to make it. It is his free
promise that causes him to act in the way that he does, not my actions. Pari
passu, then, it is God's free covenant that causes my salvation in this
medieval and Arminian view.
There is an objection that would be made to this by any card-carrying
Calvinist. Does the view not amount to my actions' meriting justification?
The simple answer here is, No. Forget, for the moment, about the divine
promise. Merit would only arise in the case that my actions placed God
under some sort of obligation to justify me, or something functionally
equivalent to obligation.3 And-setting aside a divine promise-such an
obligation or quasi-obligation could arise only if the nature of my actions
were such as morally to require justification as a reward. (In such a case, a
promise to reward the actions would be superfluous if the rewarding
agency were necessarily good.) Still, nothing about my account thus far
entails that the minimal requirements that need to be satisfied for justification are such that justification is morally necessitated by them (or necessitat-
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ed in some way that does duty for moral necessitation in the case that God
is not morally good). Consider the reward assigned on the basis of a free
divine promise. If there is merit here at all, it is what the scholastics used
to call merit de congruo--the appropriateness of God's rewarding an action.
In fact we do not even need to talk of merit de congruo at all. God's promise
could be wholly gratuitous, and nothing about my actions would have any
intrinsic meritorious value-they would be, other than the divine promise
to reward them, wholly valueless, and not be such as to make it even
appropriate for God to reward them. In any case the only obligation is
imposed by God on himself. It seems to me that there is nothing Pelagian
about this.
Is the covenant view that I am considering here semi-Pelagian in the
way that I have defined this latter term? I suspect that it is, though I do not
know of a knock-down argument to show this. Clearly, the question is:
what initiates the process of justification in this covenant theology? There
are two possible contenders: God's promise, and the human person's satisfaction of the minimal moral requirements for justification. Although there
do not seem to be any decisive arguments here, I believe nevertheless that
a reasonably powerful case can be made to the effect that it is the human
action, on this covenant theology, that is the initiation of justification. The
argument considers the relationship between the promise or covenant, on
the one hand, and the process of justification, on the other. The basic intuition is that the promise is, causally, too remote from any particular
instance of justification to count as the initiation of such an instance. The
promise is more like a general condition for justification: it is more like the
"machinery" of justification than a causal part in the process itself. The
promise is a way of setting up a process of justification. But what initiates
the process is the human action. The promise is not a particular divine
action preveniently giving grace to a particular individual. The actual gift
is subsequent to the individual's acting in the minimally required way.4
An analogy may help here. Consider a machine that is used to manufacture sausages. The machine is a general condition for the manufacture
of sausages. But we would not say that the mere presence of the machine
initiates the production of a particular sausage. We would say that the
sausage manufacturer does this when he starts the machine running.
Analogously, then, I conclude that covenant theologies are indeed semiPelagian in the sense defined. Still, I do not believe that this argument
would be sufficient to convince someone very strongly wedded to the antiPelagian structure of a covenant theology. Such a person could insist that
God's promise counts as the initiation of every process of justification, and
thus hold that a covenant theology is neither Pelagian nor semi-Pelagian.
III

The six remaining theologies that I consider all insist that the initiation of
an individual's justification is God's active offer of grace to that individual.
Such views, then, are by definition not semi-Pelagian. Nevertheless, since,
on the theories I am considering here, grace is resistible, any active offer of
grace requires some form of acceptance. This acceptance is not in any
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sense prior to the actual particular offer of grace to any individual.
Covenants or promises are irrelevant here. A covenant of the kind
described above is required only if the offer of grace itself is to be made
conditional on the satisfaction of certain minimal ethical requirements.
Since all the views that I have in mind hold to the resistibility of grace, it
is important to understand, as a preliminary point, that the acceptance of
grace, provided that it consist in some positive act, cannot itself be the necessary result of any divine gift. For consider acceptance on the assumption
that it is itself a divine gift. Either this gift is resistible or not. If it is irresistible, then grace is irresistible. If the gift of acceptance is resistible, then
the gift of acceptance itself needs accepting. Consider this second-level
acceptance. If it is an irresistible divine gift, then grace is irresistible. If it is
resistible, then we will need another divine gift to allow us to accept it, and
so on ad infinitum. Acceptance, therefore, cannot be a divine gift if grace is
to be resistible, and, by the same token, anyone who holds that acceptance
is such a gift will have to be committed to the irresistibility of grace. What
I shall be concerned with in the rest of this short article is seeing whether it
is possible to combine robust anti-Pelagianism with some view according
to which the human acceptance of the offer of grace is not itself the result
of grace (i.e. is not sufficiently caused by grace).
The first of the six remaining views is that the acceptance of grace
offered counts, in effect, as a work-something that the person to whom
grace is offered actually does. Furthermore, it is a work that is entirely
within the agent's own power, and entirely a result of the natural dispositions and inclinations of the agent. Now, this work may about as minimal
a work as can be conceived. But a work it is, its possibly minimal nature
notwithstanding. (The work need not be minimal; presumably, its precise
identity would be dependent wholly on a divine decision.) This would
amount to one version of the view known to early Lutheran theologians as
"synergism"-and vehemently rejected by such theologians as Pelagian. Is
this Lutheran rejection correct? This largely depends on how the Pelagian
claim is construed. If we hold that Pelagianism amounts to the claim that
we can sufficiently save ourselves by our own actions, then the version of
synergism that I am considering here is not Pelagian. After all, by definition synergism holds that there are two necessary and jointly sufficient
causes of our justification-God and ourselves-and hence we cannot on
this view sufficiently cause our own justification. If God's action is necessary, then our action alone is not sufficient. Still, we could read the Second
Council of Orange as affirming that no action of ours can have any sort of
causal role--even if not a sufficient causal role-in justification. In this
case, the version of synergism that I am considering here would indeed
amount to Pelagianism.
I think it is important to keep in mind that nothing about the statements
made by the Council implies one of these readings over and above the
other. Why should anyone adopt the stronger reading? One answer that
certain theolOgians in the past have favored is simply that if our own free
acceptance is required for justification, then God's grace is not wholly reliable. Still, this answer depends on an acceptance of the doctrine of the irresistibility of grace, and for the purposes of this discussion I am not presup-
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posing such a doctrine-indeed, I am proceeding as if this doctrine is false.
It seems to me that the question of the absolute reliability of divine grace is
on the face of it a question independent of Pelagianism.5
Another reason for adopting the stronger reading may go something
like this. The offer of grace, and our acceptance of it, are sequentially
ordered parts of a process. In one sense an element in a process is not sufficient for the outcome of that process; it is merely necessary. Still, someone could insist that the element is sufficient for the outcome given the
causally prior parts of the process. It is precisely this intuition, I think, that
motivates some theologians to believe that any theology that allows for an
independent act of accepting grace will turn out to be Pelagian. The
thought is a mistake, since the sequential nature of the causal cooperation
does not prevent it from being cooperation, and hence does not require
that an action later in the process is any sense a sufficient cause of the
effect. So it seems to me that synergism amounts to Pelagianism only if it
is felt that any ascription of a causal role to human activity in justification~ven if not a sufficient causal role-is Pelagian. And it is not clear
that the Second Council of Orange requires this view.
IV

Suppose, however, that we do adopt such a rigid reading of antiPelagianism, and require for orthodoxy that there can be no natural active
human cooperation in justification. Would such a position require us to
accept the irresistibility of grace? I doubt it; and seeing how we can avoid
the irresistibility of grace even given a rejection of synergism brings me to
my next three possible anti-Pelagian options-the third, fourth, and fifth of
the seven I propose in all. It seems to me that it would be possible to hold
both that no naturally caused act of acceptance is required in order for
divine grace to be received by the person to be justified, and that grace can
nevertheless be resisted. The basic idea is that, in the case of someone
whom God has chosen for justification, the reception of grace is, as it were,
the default position; grace is received automatically unless the person
places some active bar or block on the reception of grace-that is to say,
unless the person actively resists the grace.
I am going to suppose-for my next three anti-Pelagian options-that
for a person p to accept grace is for p not to resist the bodily execution of
some action a, somehow resistibly brought about by God in p. For the theory, it does not matter what a consist in, but let me for now claim that a
must be a morally good action, or one which would have been morally
good if brought about by merely creaturely agency. If we hold that justification consist in explicit faith, we will want to say something slightly different from what I am about to propose. I shall consider the explicit faith
option later.
All three of the theologies that I am about to propose require us to
accept claims that are in one way or another debatable. The first requires
us to accept a claim that may be theologically dubious in this anti-Pelagian
context, namely, that the causal origin of a is an inclination internal to the
agent-though unlike the synergistic position considered in the previous
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section, this inclination is entirely supernatural, irresistibly given by God.
The second and third require the philosophically controversial notion of an
interior act of will, distinct from any exterior act.
The first of these-my third anti-Pelagian option-posits that the relevant action is the causal result of a supernatural inclination. Such an inclination would be (irresistibly) given by God to a person, such that the inclination is sufficient-unless-impeded for the action. The performance of the
action counts as the acceptance of grace. I understand an inclination here
to be a positive tendency to perform an act, such that, if nothing intervenes,
the act is brought about. On this sort of view, an inclination is not itself an
act, and acting in accordance with the inclination does not require any kind
of further causal cooperation on the part of the agent: it does not require the
agent to will or choose the relevant action a, though it does require that the
agent not deliberately will/ choose/ do something other than a. 6 The action
would nevertheless count as the relevant human person's action, since it is
brought about by something internal to the person, namely, the inclination.
A close example may make things clearer. Consider a generally involuntary but controllable act such as blinking. My blinking goes on automatically: I do not usually will it, or consciously cause it. But I can prevent it if
I wish, at least for a time; indeed, I can deliberately cause it too. I take it, in
fact, that I have a (natural) inclination to blink, and the inclination is causally sufficient for the action. 7 I am supposing that acting in accordance with
the relevant divinely-given inclination will be like this, and this amounts to
my third anti-Pelagian strategy: the God-given inclination is sufficientunless-impeded for an action a that constitutes the acceptance of grace, and
this sufficiency means that the creature does not need to will or choose a, or
in some other way further causally cooperate in a (over and above the
causally sufficient role played by the inclination).8
On this view, the action certainly belongs to the agent, since it is caused
by some inclination internal to the agent. But it is a divinely-originated
inclination, internal to the agent, that is sufficient (unless impeded) for the
action. The agent brings no causal contribution of his or her own other
than the divinely-originated inclination. Still, it may be felt that any causal
contribution to the action, internal to the agent, entails some sort of synergism. For whether or not the inclination is natural or divinely-endowed in
some special way, it is still the agent's inclination, and to this extent is still a
causal contribution that is proper to the agent, and as such independent of
direct divine causal activity in the performance of the act. So my next two
options dispense with such an internal origin altogether.
My fourth anti-Pelagian strategy posits straightforwardly that the relevant action a is brought about directly by God-and not by means of (say)
an inclination. God brings about the bodily motion in which some act a
consists. This strategy, along with the fifth, that I consider in a moment,
requires the notion of an interior act of will, such that the agent's willing a is
distinct from the agent's doing a. The fourth anti-Pelagian strategy involves
the distinctive claim that the agent's not-willing/ choosing/ doing not-a
consists in the agent's willing a. Could an agent will a and yet there be
some sense in which the agent is not responsible for doing a, or in which
the agent's willing is not a causally necessary condition for a's being done?
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There seem to me to be two options consistent with an affirmative answer
to these questions. Ex hypothesi, a is brought about by God. So the first
option is that God sever whatever causal mechanisms obtain between the
interior act-willing a-and the exterior act-doing a. The choosing or
willing does not have any causal role, for God's action remains sufficientunless-impeded. The creature's choosing or willing is counterfactually sufficient, as we might say: it would have been sufficient were God not causally responsible for bringing about the bodily execution of the action. The
second option is simply that a is causally overdetermined, brought about
sufficiently by God, and sufficiently by the created agent. Clearly, we can
on this understanding claim both that a is brought about by God, and that
a is brought about by the creature; on this option, we would need to assert
that a is salvific merely in the case that it is true that a is brought about by
God, irrespective of the truth of the claim that a is brought about by the
creature.9 So the relevant salvific claim is that a is brought about by God,
and thus Pelagianism, even on the rigidly anti-synergistic understanding
that I am considering here, is avoided.
This may all seem implausible, and if it does, then the notion of an act of
will can be used to develop a further anti-Pelagian strategy-my fifththat allows for the resistibility of grace. On this fifth strategy, the act a itself
is simply brought about by God, without any causal origin in the person,
or any interior act of will for a on the part of the person. The created person wills neither a nor not-a: the person's will is simply indifferent to a. In
distinction from the fourth anti-Pelagian view, the person does not will a at
all, though in line with the views considered thus far in this section, the
fifth view maintains that willing not-a constitutes resisting grace. On this
fifth view, as on the fourth, God moves the person like a puppet: God
brings about the bodily motions in which some act a consists. But unlike
the fourth view, the person thus moved has no act of will of his own at all.
This avoids the claim that the action is at all an action of the creature. But
the divine motion can be sufficient-unless-impeded for a. For, prior to a,
the creature can will, choose, or do not-a (in some sense of 'prior,' for if a is
really prevented, there is no act for the impeding act to be prior to).H!
Perhaps on this view a will not be a morally good act: but it could be counterfactually good (as we lnight say)-it would have been good had it been
brought about by merely creaturely agency.ll Note that my fourth and
fifth anti-Pelagian strategies are combinable: not-willing not-a could consist
either in willing a, or in being wholly indifferent about a, willing neither a
nor not-a-and a combined theory would allow for both possibilities.
It is worth pausing here to consider a little more closely precisely what it
is that I am proposing. It might be thought that the concession that a person can impede God's bringing about a in her by preemptively doing not-a
somehow makes her salvation wholly up to her after all, since God's doing
a is still dependent on her not doing not-a. My proposal, however, is that
her doing not-a at a time t simply prevents God from bringing about a at in
her t, provided that God does not coercively prevent her from doing not-a.
This amounts to a kind of Augustinianism: damnation is, and salvation is
not, something which is brought about by the creature. God can, of course,
make it hard for her to do not-a (perhaps by giving her an inclination not to
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do not-a). But that is another question.
Is the view that a person can impede God's action by somehow "getting
there first" a plausible view of resistance? It is, in the sense that not doing
not-a is necessary for God's doing a; and what is necessary in this case is
just the creature's refraining from acting. Equally, resistance does not need
to be conscious. But if this be felt to be unsatisfactory, a more nuanced
view is available. After all, if the relevant action is of a kind that would, if
brought about by the creature independently, count as a moral action-as I
am supposing-then it is likely to be a complex and drawn out activity,
consisting of more than one stage. And if it is the sort of action that takes a
reasonable amount of time, then opportunities for resistance arise throughout-right Up to the moment at which the action is completed. There is no
reason for the resistance of grace not to be like this.
Consider a related example. Suppose someone moves me in such-andsuch a way-perhaps (taking a crude example) I wake up to find myself
traveling in an ambulance. Suppose too that I have, all the time that I am
conscious of being in the ambulance, the option not to be there. Perhaps I
can simply ask the driver to stop and let me out. If I do not do this, then I
do not impede the action that is done to me-being brought to hospital, or
whatever. But-by the same token-I do not causally contribute to it,
other than counterfactually (i.e. by not impeding it). Does not-impeding a
amount to wanting or doing a? Not generally, given the coherence of the
notion of an interior act of will, for given this it is possible to accept that
there are many things that I, for example, neither impede nor want--even
in the case that I can impede them. If I do not do something, I remain in
the ambulance. But it would be odd to describe this as a case of my going
to the hospital (as opposed to being brought there).
None of this, of course, entails that God is the causal origin of all morally good works-though we certainly could claim this if we wished.
Neither do we have to commit ourselves to the position that God offer
grace to all-though of course such a position is certainly possible. The
point about any morally good work not brought about as the direct result
of divine grace is that such a work cannot be relevant to the process of justification. 12
Thus far, I have supposed that the acceptance of grace consists in the
bodily execution of some factually or counterfactually good act.
Traditionally, of course, grace and the acceptance of grace are closely tied
to the notion of faith. Suppose, for example, that justifying grace consists,
or could consist, in divinely-originated faith.13 Since I am supposing that
grace is resistible, I need such faith to be a voluntary matter. I thus need to
posit that faith consists in, or results from, some sort of interior act of will
distinct from any exterior act-distinct, in other words, from any bodily
execution of an act. My last two anti-Pelagian strategies make precisely
these presuppositions.
These two final strategies correspond respectively to the third and fifth
strategies just outlined. According to the sixth anti-Pelagian strategy, God
gives someone an inclination to an act of faith, such that the inclination is
sufficient-unless-impeded for the interior act of faith. The account then
goes through exactly as for the third anti-Pelagian strategy, with the excep-

Faith and Philosophy

208

tion that the inclination is for an interior act, not for the bodily execution of
some act. According to the seventh anti-Pelagian strategy, God's direct
action is sufficient-unless-impeded for the interior act of faith-as for the
fifth anti-Pelagian strategy, mutatis mutandis. 14 I do not need to adjudicate
on what precisely saving faith might consist in. But I take it that, since on
the view I am defending faith is a voluntary matter, it is more likely to consist in trust (in the offered salvation-fiducia, in the technical theological
jargon) than in belief in certain propositions. After all, bcZieving is on the
face of it a state, not something subject to direct voluntary controL"
***

1£ I am right, there is a variety of different views open to someone who
wants to hold both that all forms of Pelagianism are false and that grace is
resistible. It may be thought that in proposing these views, I am overlooking one of the fundamental motivations for the view that grace is irresistible, namely, the sheer difficulty of acting well (i.e. in accordance with the
prompting of divine grace). In reply, I would suggest that the views I consider here make use of the notions of God's inclining us to act in the relevant ways, or of God's moving us to act in the relevant ways. Someone
who is not satisfied with these possible answers will need to accept the irresistibility of grace with all the attendant difficulties of that view. In any
case, if we want to hold that God saves sumers, not just saints, we will probably need to make the moral requirements of salvation rather low, irrespective of our view on the question of Pelagianism. But that is another issue. 16

Oriel Col/ege, Oxford
NOTES
1. That is to say, the Council is not denying that we can perform morally
good works; merely that any such work can have any sort of causal role in our
justification. Compare Aquinas's claim that we can perform morally good
works without grace: Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 109, a. 5 c. Nothing that I rely
on in my argument here requires this reading, and the reader could adopt, if
she wished, the stronger claim that we can perform no morally good act without grace.
2. There is, of course, at least one theory of justification that aims to link it
logically with the atonement: namely, the Reformed view that, necessarily, justification consists in the extrinsic imputation of Christ's righteousness. I do not
know whether such a theory is true; even if it is true, however, my arguments
here, about the anti-Pelagian structures of certain theologies that admit the
resistibility of grace, will be untouched.
3. I add this last clause partly to take account of the common traditional
view that God has no obligations: see on this, in particular, Thomas V. Morris,
"Duty and Divine Goodness," American Philosophical Quarterly, 21 (1984): 261-8.
4. It should go without saying that I am supposing that the individual's
response here is not causally dependent on any special divine action. If it
were, of course, then the doctrine would not be semi-Pelagian, since the
response to the divine promise would be initiated by God, not by a creature.
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But if the human response were so dependent, the theory would resemble one
or more of the theories that I discuss below, and it would be hard to see why
the divine promise was not simply redundant.
5. The question of the irresistibility of grace is, however, linked with the
question of divine sovereignty, inasmuch as it is clearly the case that a powerful
motivation for accepting the irresistibility of grace is a strong doctrine of divine
sovereignty. If my argument in this paper is correct, then the rejection of
Pelagianism is in principle independent of the question of divine sovereignty.
6. Lest there be any doubt about this, I am assuming that whatever view we
adopt of causation, causal relations are not reducible to constant conjunction,
and should not be understood merely counterfactually. 1 think that there are
reliable intuitions about the ways in which particular events and particular
substances may be connected to each other, and that these intuitions posit
more robust connections than constant conjunction or mere counterfactual
dependence. For our commonsense notion is that there are things in the
world-substances-that are able to cause certain effects, such that there is
some genuinely explanatory relation-some real linkage-between the cause
and the effect. Neither constant conjunction nor counterfactual dependence
maintains such a connection. A definition of causation that is faithful to our
intuitions on the matter would have to include the fact that a cause seems to
make some genuine contribution to the effect: something that the cause is or
does is responsible for the effect; the effect somehow derives from the cause.
7. It will not make much difference to my account whether or not we think
of blinking as an action. Blinking could be merely an event; but deliberately
resisting the inclination to blink is surely an action.
8. There is, of course, a distinction between blinking and the type of action
that could be relevant to the acceptance of grace. Blinking is not only involuntary but for the most part unconscious. There is no reason to suppose that the
acceptance of grace need be thus unconscious; indeed, the kind of complex
moral action that would be relevant in this case would certainly be something
that the agent would be aware of-though, of course, the agent need not be
aware that the action would be salvific. Virtuous habits would be analogous:
someone acts in accordance with such a habit unless she actively resists; but
she nevertheless would certainly be consciously aware of the action thus
brought about. She would not act virtuously merely through negligence, as it
were. Pari passu, the I?erson accepting grace would not act in accordance with
the inclination through negligence, even if such a person were not aware that
the act thus brought about counted as the acceptance of divinely-offered grace.
9. We may not, on this view, need to exploit the notion of an act of will at
all, simply asserting that a is done by God and that a is done by the creature,
irrespective of any account of the causal mechanisms involved. But 1 am not
sure about this.
10. This account does not entail, of course, that prior to a there has to be
some sort of act of will or choice for a. So there are no problems of causal
regress here. (lowe this point, along with some of the material in this section,
to Thomas Williams.) The fact that there does not need to be an act of will or
choice for a prior to a allows acceptance not to be prior to the offer of grace: the
offer of grace to a person is God's moving her body, and acceptance is not
resisting; this non-resistance is not prior to God's moving the person's body.
11. We could perhaps claim that the action is good, and that it is in some
very loose sense the creature's action, in the sense that the creature does not
resist its being brought about in him.
12. Does the belief that someone justified could merit (further) reward from
God entail any form of Pelagianism (as Protestants have often asserted against
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Catholics)? I do not see that it should do. The Pelagian claim is that we somehow cause our own salvation, and ex hypothesi this is not what is caused by the
good works of someone who is already justified. Catholic views concerning
the sacrament of penance (confession) may require more work. After all, it is
certainly an acceptable Catholic view that contrition is required for the restoration of justification. But this could easily be covered by the theory I am
proposing here, namely that God can cause works (though not such that we
cannot resist this causal influence), the performance of which constitutes the
acceptance of justifying grace. Contrition could be just such a work.
Protestants may find Catholic talk of gaining and losing justification puzzling.
But this puzzlement springs ultimately from the Reformed view that justification consists in the extrinsic imputation of Christ's righteousness-and this is
not an issue that I want or need to discuss here. My positions are on the whole
independent of any specific theory of the atonement. One necessary precondition for the view that someone justified could merit further reward from God
is that there are supererogatory works, and there may be arguments against
the possibility of such works-though I do not know of a successful one.
13. I say 'could consist', because these theories can easily be combined with
any of those just adumbrated.
14. There is no correlate to the fourth strategy here, because on the view 1
am considering faith is a voluntary matter, and thus an interior act. And there
can be no interior act of wanting to have faith that is distinct from having faith.
(I do not mean that someone could not say [and mean] that she wants to have
faith but cannot. This is surely a way of saying that she holds certain overriding beliefs that are incompatible with Christian faith.)
15. I am grateful to William Hasker, and to an anonymous referee for Faith
and Philosophy, for this point. It is perhaps worth keeping in mind that even
Catholic theologians make space for the notion of trust in the understanding of
justifying faith: see e.g. Aquinas's discussion at Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 2, a. 2.
16. Thanks to Thomas Williams, Keith Ward, and the editor and two anonymous referees of this journal.

